Sunday, October 13, 2013

Sticky Wages Explained

T cover-to-cover.  The book is a miracle ...First published in 1999, the book builds on Bewley's interviews with over 300 employers, labor leaders, unemployment counselors, and business consultants during the mild recession of the early 1990s.  Everyone he interviewed had ample first-hand experience with real-world employment and compensation decisions.  The purpose of these conversations: To evaluate a wide range of labor economists' theories in light of practitioners' testimony.

...Bewley successfully answers not only the title question of his book, but scores of follow-up questions.  While I was sympathetic to his basic answer before I started the book, he made me appreciate several layers of complexity I'd previously missed.  In each case, he managed to elegantly resolve the very complexities he raised....

Question: Don't wages fall all the time?

Answer: Real wages fall all the time, and nominal wages often fall when workers change jobs.  But nominal wages hardly ever fall for a given worker at a given job - even when there's massive excess supply of qualified labor.

Question: OK, so why don't nominal wages fall for given workers at given jobs?

Answer: Because almost all employers realize that nominal wage cuts are terrible for morale - and bad morale is bad for worker productivity. 

Question: Why don't they cut wages, then fire workers who slack off?

Answer: Because labor productivity heavily depends on trust and reciprocity.  Firing can deter specific offenses, but can't make workers broadly promote their employers' interests.  Plus productivity is much easier to observe at the group level than the individual level.

Question: Why don't employers just cut wages for new hires, then?  Do new low-paid workers really have bad morale?  Do old workers really resent new low-paid co-workers?

Answer: Initially, there's no morale problem at all.  New workers are thrilled to land a job, even if the pay is low.  Old workers only resent new workers if the newbies outearn them.  The problems start once the new workers realize they're paid less than their co-workers for doing the same job.  After 3-4 months, this leads to bad morale for new hires.  The new hires' resentment then poisons old workers' morale as well.

Question: So why not just fire all the old workers and replace them with new workers?  Wouldn't this neutralize the resentment?

Answer: Yes, but it would be very expensive to retrain a whole workforce from scratch.  Plus employers worry this would give them a reputation as a bad employer and bad corporate citizen.

Question: So a few years worth of mild inflation would solve the problem?

Answer: I'm afraid not.  Even during recessions, most employers keep giving their current workers nominal raises.

Question: Why?

Answer: Failing to give raises hurts morale, too.  Not as drastically as a nominal pay cut would, of course.  But a firm that failed to give raises for three years in a row would spark resentment - and productivity would suffer.

Question: Can't firms at least create a two-tier wage system: Raises for existing employees, flat hiring pay for new employees?

Answer: Some have tried, especially during the 1980s.  But bad morale keeps raising its ugly head.  New workers are happy at first, but resentment of pay inequity kicks in after a few months. 

Question: Hold on.  Workers don't seem to deeply resent earning less than their CEO, do they?

Answer: Not really.  Most resentment comes from lack of "internal horizontal pay equity."  If two people in the same firm do the same job, people expect their pay to be roughly equal.  Other pay inequalities are tolerable unless they're extreme or change quickly.

Question: Can the job market really be that monolithic?

Answer: There is a major exception: the "secondary" labor market.  Part-time work, seasonal work, consulting, that sort of thing.

Question: How does the secondary labor market differ from the rest of the labor market?

Answer: In the secondary labor labor market, workers don't know each other well enough to compare their pay.  Furthermore, workers in this market rarely base their self-esteem on their careers, so they don't fret much about pay inequities if they discover them.

Question: So nominal wages do fall in the secondary market?

Answer: Not for the same worker for the same job.  But in the secondary labor market, employers often cut nominal wages for new hires.  In fact, some employers in the secondary market deliberately prod their longer-time, higher-paid workers to quit so they can replace them with new, low-paid workers.  They freely confessed it.

Question: Workers seem to prefer a small risk of unemployment to a large chance of a nominal wage cut.  Who are you to second-guess their utility function?

Answer: Everyone with first-hand experience said that lay-offs are devastating for workers - financially and otherwise.  Pay cuts, in contrast, mostly just wound workers' pride.  That's why workers react so much more negatively to nominal pay cuts than real pay cuts.

Question: You're still being pretty paternalistic, aren't you?

Answer: Employers often openly compared their workers to children.  I suspect they're on to something. [Disclaimer: Bewley is probably too gentlemanly to actually say this, but it's very consistent with his findings.]

Question: OK, what happens when employers go ahead and cut nominal wages despite the expected morale problems?

Answer: It's hard to say with much confidence because nominal wage cuts are very rare.  I deliberately sought out firms that cut nominal pay, and found two very different patterns.

Question: Namely?

Answer: Firms in blatant financial distress found that pay cuts worked as long as they clearly explained the situation to their workers.  Otherwise, pay cuts failed from employers' own point of view.

Question: Do pay cuts cause any additional problems besides bad morale?

Answer: Yes.  Employers expect their best workers to leave first.  With lay-offs, in contrast, employers make their worst workers leave first.  (Exception: Unionized firms usually lay-off on the basis of seniority, not productivity).

Question: Doesn't this suggest that the better-paid employees were underpaid?

Answer: Absolutely.  Internal horizontal pay equity norms depress pay for good workers and inflate pay for bad workers.

Question: I'm confused.  Don't lay-offs hurt morale, too?

Answer: Yes, but the damage is relatively short-lived.  Wage cuts keep misery close to home. Lay-offs "get misery out the door." 

Question: Is that the whole story?

Answer: No.  Lay-offs are bad for morale if they drag on, or if workers see no light at the end of the tunnel.  But a big quick wave of lay-offs, followed by reassurances of job security for everyone remaining, only hurts morale for a few weeks or months.  Many employers sweeten the deal by using the cost savings of lay-offs to fund raises for remaining workers!

Question: So human psychology, not government intervention, is the sole cause of unemployment?

Answer: That's too strong.  Employers of low-skilled workers often cite the minimum wage and transfer payments as important factors.  For skilled workers, though, government policy isn't very relevant.

Question: Bottom line: All we need to do to end the scourge of involuntary unemployment is replace human workers with Vulcans?

Answer: Maybe.  I deliberately bypass this high-level macroeconomic question to focus on easier-to-answer micro questions.  But none of my evidence contradicts the view that involuntary unemployment would disappear if the workers of the world had a more mature attitude. 

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Lump of Labor Fallacy and Immigration

The lump of labor fallacy is the idea that there is a fixed amount of work to be done and so population growth (or larger workforce participation by women, immigrants, or the elderly) reduces jobs and increases unemployment for working-age men.  That was approximately true during Malthusian times when almost everyone was a farmer.  There was only a limited amount of work that could possibly be done on a farm to produce food.  But the economy today is completely different.  Moneybox reports:

Workforce participation among older Americans has gone up since the 1990s due to diminished wealth and perhaps some demographical factors, and some people see it as something that "squeezes" younger workers out of jobs. But Suzy Khimm writes that a study from the Center for Retirement Research shows the opposite and "the evidence suggests that greater employment of older persons leads to better outcomes for the young in the form of reduced unemployment, increased employment and a higher wage."
This is is important because it intersects with two other issues that are a much bigger deal in terms of scale—formal legal curbs on international immigration and informal curbs on domestic migration via anti-density policies. Part of why people misunderstand the policy issues in those areas is that they have this same suspicion that more workers competing for a fixed pool of jobs will hurt the incumbents. But while there are certainly specific scenarios you can devise in which that's the case, the general case is the opposite. If more people come somewhere wanting to work—or more of the people who are already there decide they want to work—that has a positive impact on the other people around.
To see why, start with a time when things were different. During the Black Death, wages rose as population fell because the key input to the medieval economy was arable land. When the population is dense, all the returns go to the entrenched landowners and normal people need to live on a subsistence diet of grain. But eliminate a huge share of the population and suddenly there's plenty of land available for grazing animals and everyone gets to eat meat and cheese and butter along with their bread. Hooray!
But a modern, advanced economy is mostly made up of people. People are the key customers for the services that the majority of us produce for a living. And we produce things in teams that are composed of diverse clusters of labor. Slate has writers and copy editors and developers and art people and sales people, and we can only scale so far in any given direction without scaling across the board. A scarcity of qualified developers or skilled ad sales reps could stop us from being able to hire more writers. An ambitious sous chef might get hired as a head chef at a new restaurant but only if there are waiters and busboys to hire to staff the rest of the place. More workers means more dry cleaning gets done, and more people in town means more customers who prefer your particular approach to styling hair. Doctors are more productive when there's an ample supply of good nurses and health care technicians, and the arrival of more doctors means a greater demand for the skills of everyone else in the health care value chain. You lose out as a worker when more people with your exact skill profile show up. (Higher flows of Latin American immigration, for example, appear to depress the wages of a metro area's existing stock of Latin American immigrants.) But you win when people with different skill profiles arrive in the workforce.
And since people who are different from you outnumber the people who are the same, more people means more opportunities.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Discimination Against the Unemployed

Kevin Drum cites a new study that shows, "If you've been out of work for a year, ...It's just really hard to get anyone to give you a chance." 

The red line is how likely employers are to call back when the economy is bad (during a recession). In bad times employers do not discriminate much against people who have been out of work a long time.  They don't call anyone back much!  The blue line shows that employers greatly discriminate against people who have been out of work for more than twelve months.  Is it statistical discrimination?

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

licensure and labor mobility

Moneybox:
one consequence of occupational licensing rules is to make it difficult to move from state to state. A licensed interior decorator in southeastern Georgia might be considering a move to nearby Jacksonville, FL but then she'd have to get a new license. This turns out to be particularly burdensome on military families since they tend to move around so much. Last week the Department of Defense and the Treasury Department teamed up to release a report on this, noting that 35 percent of military spouses in the labor force are in licensed occupations and that military spouses are ten times more likely than their civilian counterparts to have moved across state lines in the last year. ...It's quite possible that civilian families would be more likely to relocate if they weren't burdened by licensing concerns. Historically a very high level of internal labor mobility has been one of the strengths of the American economy, but our mobility rate has declined for the past few decades... The federal government has only a very limited role to play in this issue, but I'd love to see more federal efforts to shed light. I could easily imagine this being an issue that a nice bipartisan blue ribbon commission could actually tackle in effective way. I don't think anyone in America has a strong ideological stake in the yacht broker licensing issue, but these rules tend to just grow denser and denser over time if nobody pays attention.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Boom-Towns & Baby-Booms vs. Immigration

People do not think a baby boom is as worrisome as immigration.  Nor intranational migration. Yglesias:
When people hear about a town that's attracting many new residents, they say it's "booming" not that the newcomers are poaching a fixed supply of jobs. Nobody in Texas seems to have proposed trying to close the state to migrants from the Northeast and Midwest; rather, they see the state's attraction to migrants as one of its strengths. The "foreign-ness" of newcomers from other countries distracts people from fundamental dynamics that they understand in other contexts.

Saturday, November 5, 2011

Mandel:
I started writing about tough times for young college grads in 2006, when I was at BusinessWeek. Seems like a different day and age, doesn’t it?  Since then things have only gotten much much worse.  By my latest calculations:
  • Real earnings for young male college grads are down 19% since their peak in 2000.
  • Real earnings for young female college grads are down 16% since their peak in 2003.
These figures are for full-time workers, ages 25-34, with a bachelor’s degree only. See the charts below.
I want to ask an economic question, a political question, and a policy question.  First, no one has given me a good explanation yet of why young American college grads should have been hit so hard. Is there increased competition with young college grads around the world?  Are new college grads lower quality than their predecessors? Has information technology reduced the need for young grads? I really would like to know.
Politically, Obama captured the imagination of this group in 2008. Are young college graduates going to sit out the next presidential election in disgust?  Is there any candidate that can excite them?
Finally, if  we were going to design some economic policies to help young college grads, what would they be?

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Nutty PhD in Humanities?

Author Louis Menand On Reforming U.S. Universities : NPR:
an enormous number of new campuses opened up in the 1950s and 1960s. ...Then after 1970, the system started to slow down and even go backwards, and you ended up with an enormous number of PhDs for a declining number of slots.
...the number of PhDs awarded has been going up pretty steadily since the 1970s, and the number of job openings has more or less been going down.
...the time it takes to get the PhD has been increasing steadily since the 1970s so that the median time to get a PhD in a humanities discipline, like philosophy, English, art history, is nine years.
...Now, if you think that you can get a law degree and argue a case before the Supreme Court in three years, get a medical degree and cut somebody open in four years, why should it take nine years to teach poetry to college freshmen?
...only about half the people who enroll in graduate programs in English actually get the PhD - only five percent of those ended up teaching in research universities, which is really what we're training our students to do.

Monday, September 26, 2011

Licensure

Medical licensing only became important 100 years ago with the publishing of the Flexner Report.  Other occupations have been catching up since then.  Due to licensing requirements in Illinois, it took longer to "become a master plumber than for a newly graduated physician to become a Fellow of the American College of Surgeons." Alan Kreuger says licensing is growing in many sectors of the economy:
Morris M. Kleiner, ...questions whether occupational licensing has gone too far. He provides much evidence that the balance of occupational licensing has shifted away from protecting consumers and toward limiting the supply of workers in various professions. A result is that services provided by licensed workers are more expensive than necessary and that quality is not noticeably affected.... Professor Kleiner conservatively estimates that 20 percent of workers in 2000 were in an occupation that was covered by a state licensing requirement, up from 5 percent in the 1950's.
He said that licensing has mushroomed because the service sector, where licensing is more prevalent, has grown rapidly and because more occupations have started requiring licenses.
...A state-by-state list of the occupations covered by licensing requirements is available from www.acinet.org/acinet/licensedoccupations.... Perhaps as many as 3 of every 10 workers nationwide are required to obtain a license to do their job.... Kleiner and a colleague, Robert T. Kudrle, found that stricter state licensing requirements for dentists did not noticeably affect the dental health of 464 Air Force recruits. Other studies have found at best weak evidence that students in classes taught by licensed teachers performed better than those taught by unlicensed teachers.
Summarizing the literature, Professor Kleiner concludes, "there is little to show that occupational regulation has a major effect on the quality of service received by consumers."
At the same time, the hurdles imposed by occupational licensing reduce the supply of workers in many regulated professions, which drives up wages in those jobs and the price of services. Dentists, for example, were found to earn and charge 11 percent more in states with the most restrictive licensing requirements. While tough licensing standards may help higher-income consumers avoid low-quality providers, it also appears to prevent lower-income consumers from gaining access to some services.
Professor Kleiner said that a frequent pattern was for workers who have common interests and provide a homogeneous service to form an association. That association then seeks regulation to restrict the number of people who can work in the occupation. The state legislature and governor have little incentive to resist this pressure because the state gains revenue from license fees.
The most notable opposition to licensing comes from large buyers like hospitals, which object to the monopolization of their suppliers. In most cases, however, consumers are diffuse and have little individual incentive to oppose licensing.
Another factor driving the growth of occupational licensing is the decline of labor unions. Apparently, the labor market abhors a vacuum; it needs some institutions and rules to function. Occupational licensing has replaced unions as the main labor market institution. There are now more than twice as many workers covered by occupational licensing provisions as are covered by a labor union contract.
"There is a lot more flexibility with unions than occupational licensing," Professor Kleiner said. Unions, he pointed out, negotiate at the company level and can be decertified, whereas occupational license requirements are typically statewide and rarely repealed.

Women Earned The Majority of Doctorates In 2009

Chronicle

Saturday, September 17, 2011

Impact of Recessions on Earnings

People who get laid off during a recession lose their skills because they cannot get another job quickly and skills depreciate.  Plus, employers discriminate against people who have been unemployed (or underemployed) for an extended time.  These factors and others like the depression that often haunts the unemployed have long-lasting effects.  Kevin Drum:
Here's a gloomy chart from a new Brookings paper. It shows the average wages of men under 50 who lose their jobs in a "mass layoff" event.
  • The red line is for men who are laid off during good economic times. On average, these men have steeply rising earnings in the five years before the layoff and then experience a big earnings plunge. They eventually get back to their old earnings level, but that's it. Their earnings never again get above that.
  • The blue line is for men who are laid off during recessions. They also have steeply rising earnings in the five years before the layoff and then experience a big earnings plunge. However, they never even come close to their old earnings level. They max out at about $36,000 compared to peak earnings before the layoff of $45,000.
The steeply rising earnings before the layoff are a little perplexing to me, and I wonder if this is related in any way to the probability of being laid off in the first place. The main takeaway, though, is that if you lose your job during a recession, you are probably screwed for the rest of your life. Even ten years later you'll earn about 20% less than you did before. This price has been paid needlessly by hundreds of thousands of workers because our political leaders have never had the courage to take action strong enough to get our economy moving again.

Friday, September 16, 2011

Gender, Height, Intelligence, and Status

 Unlike the psychologist below, I do not endorse the idea that men are more intelligent than women on average because it is really hard to define intelligence.  Men are more intelligent than women on some kinds of tasks and clearly less intelligent than women on other kinds of tasks.  Given that men largely created the IQ tests, it should not be too surprising if they selected tasks that felt they were good at to put on the IQ tests.  It is impossible for me to say which kinds of intellectual tasks are the most important parts of intelligence, so I do not claim that one gender is more intelligent than the other.  However, I have never seen a behavioral quality where men have less variance than women.  No doubt some exist, but all the (somewhat limited) studies I have seen have demonstrated that men are more variable.  That is important for explaining differences in extremes between men and women. For example, most mentally retarded people are men and most geniuses are too.   Psychology Today:
The orthodoxy in intelligence research for the second half of the 20th century had been that men and women had the same average intelligence, but men had greater variance in their distribution than women.  Most geniuses were men, and most imbeciles were men, they said, while most women were in the normal range.  This conclusion, however, was manufactured out of political expediency.  Not wanting to discover, or a priori denying, any sex differences in intelligence, psychometricians simply deleted from the standardized IQ tests any item on which the performance of men and women differed.
More recently, however, especially since the turn of the millennium, there have been an increasing number of studies that cast doubt on this politically correct conclusion.  Studies with large representative national samples from Spain, Denmark, and the United States, as well as meta-analyses of a large number of published studies throughout the world, all conclude that men on average are slightly but significantly more intelligent than women, by about 3-5 IQ points.  So this has now become the new (albeit tentative) consensus in intelligence research.
...Psychometricians have known since the end of the 19th century that height is positively correlated with intelligence:  Taller people on average are more intelligent than shorter people.  And men in every human population are taller than women.  So one possibility is that men are more intelligent than women, not because they are men, but because they are taller.
... In fact, once we control for height, women are slightly but significantly more intelligent than men.  Further controlling for health, physical attractiveness, age, race, education, and earnings does not alter this conclusion.  Height has exactly the same effect on intelligence for men and women:  Each inch in height increases the IQ by about .4 point.  The partial effect of height on intelligence is more than three times as strong as the partial effect of sex.
So it is not that men are more intelligent than women, but that taller people are more intelligent than shorter people, but net of height women are more intelligent than men.  Women who are 5’10” are on average more intelligent than men who are 5’10”, and women who are 5’5” are on average more intelligent than men who are 5’5”.  But, more importantly, people who are 5’10” are significantly more intelligent than people who are 5’5”, and most people who are 5’10” are men and most people who are 5’5” are women.
Kanazawa continues:
why are taller people more intelligent than shorter people? ...we don’t know for sure, but there are two possible explanations.  First, both height and intelligence may be indicators of underlying health.  According to this view, people who are genetically and developmentally healthier simultaneously grow taller and become more intelligent than those who are less healthy, producing the positive correlation between height and intelligence.
Kanazawa has evidence that health and intelligence are uncorrelated and he believes that intelligence and height are correlated because both are sexy!  His only evidence is the correlation between the three:  
...Taller people are on average physically more attractive than shorter people; physically more attractive people are on average more intelligent than physically less attractive people; taller people are on average more intelligent than shorter people... But the issue is far from resolved.  While there is no doubt that taller people are indeed more intelligent than shorter people, the question of why this is so is one of the remaining puzzles in evolutionary psychology.
 So, maybe the reason that tall people and beautiful people earn more than the rest of us is that they are smarter on average.  If so, then work hard on your schoolwork because smarts can be developed by exercising your brain.  An alternative hypothesis is that height, and beauty, are correlated with self-confidence and status and that leads to higher achievement on intelligence tests and higher earnings.  Again, confidence and status can be developed by working hard to achieve mastery.  Social support helps increase learning, confidence, and status.  Encourage your friends to work (and think) hard. 
Society awards status to tall, beautiful people and that increases confidence.  One study found that it is one's relative height in adolescence that increases later smarts and earnings rather than one's height at other ages.  It is hard to think of a biological reason why height in adolescence would increase later earnings and smarts, but it is easy to see why it would increase status and confidence during an extremely socially awkward time in most people's lives.  Similarly, several studies have found that it is relative height that gives a lifelong advantage to soccer players (in Europe) and hockey players (in Canada).  The kids who have birthdays near the youth league cutoff dates typically end up as the professional athletes.  That is because the older kids are relatively tall compared with other kids in their leagues growing up and that creates status and confidence and helps them get a lot of practice and love of the game.   

Monday, September 5, 2011

Cynical Thoughts On The Minimum Wage | ThinkProgress

Cynical Thoughts On The Minimum Wage | ThinkProgress:

Arindrajit Dube surveys the post-Card/Krueger minimum wage literature and concludes that their study basically holds up. My general view, with apologies to empirical econometricians doing policy-relevant work everywhere, is that one can generally Google up a study supporting whichever conclusion one prefers.

Consequently, I’ve always thought the most persuasive evidence on this was simply the big picture:

It’s clearly not the case that the high real minimum wage of the 1960s led to unusually elevated unemployment during that decade. And the fact is even more striking when you consider that the real wages of folks in the top quintile were way lower back then.

Monday, August 8, 2011

Zero Marginal Product Workers

Worthwhile Canadian Initiative: ZMP workers and output quotas:
Imagine, just imagine, that the government put a quota on the total output of, say, cars. Because some rabid environmentalists told them to. The result would be a drop in employment of auto workers. Some of those workers, who had skills useful in other sectors, would be able to find jobs elsewhere. Others, who had little or no alternative skills, would be unemployed.

Would we describe those unemployed car workers as being Zero Marginal Product workers? Not really. They are still exactly as capable of producing extra cars as they were before. It's just that their potential employers are no longer able to sell any extra cars.

Would we describe those unemployed workers as being Zero Value Marginal Product workers? Yes and no. Depends what you mean. The extra cars they could produce would have zero value to the firms trying to sell them, because they aren't allowed to sell any extra cars. But those extra cars would have exactly the same value as before to the people who wanted to drive them, but who now can't, because of the output quota on cars.

Would wage cuts help employment of car workers? Not really. An individual car worker who was willing to work for lower wages might get the job that would otherwise have gone to another worker, but that doesn't help aggregate employment of car workers. Maybe if they all cut wages their employers would use more labour-intensive methods of producing cars. That could help employment of car workers. But it would hurt employment of all the other factors used to produce cars. If all factors used in producing cars cut their "wages", that wouldn't help aggregate employment of all factors (not just workers) used in producing cars.

Now imagine, just imagine, that the government put a quota on the total output of everything, not just cars. Because the environmentalists told them that GDP is bad, and needs to be controlled. Now it's not just car workers who are unemployed. All sorts of workers are unemployed. And the unemployed workers who have skills useful in other sectors can't get jobs in those other sectors. Because there are no other sectors.

Are the unemployed workers Zero Marginal Product workers? No. Are they Zero Value Marginal Product workers? Yes and no. Depends what you mean. The extra output they could produce is still valued by the people who don't have it (who are mostly the unemployed workers themselves), but it's not valued by the firms producing it, because they aren't allowed to sell it. Would wage cuts help? Maybe a little, but not really. If wages of labour fell relative to the wages of land and machinery, firms would maybe use more labour-intensive methods of producing the same total output. But that would simply replace unemployed labour with unemployed land and machinery. If the wages of all factors fell, it wouldn't help total employment of all factors.

Let's push this analogy further. Suppose the rabid environmentalists have heard about tradeable quotas, and that they are a good idea. They issue a fixed number of "GDP permits" to households. Each household can spend its permits on whatever good it likes, at whichever firm it likes.

The Statistics Canada employees who normally measure each firm's contribution to GDP are asked to check that each firm actually receives from households the requisite number of GDP permits. And because of the standard value-added intermediate goods problem in measuring GDP, the Statistics Canada employees convince the environmentalists and government that it's much easier if each firm collects GDP permits equal to the value of its sales, and in turn pays its suppliers with those same GDP permits. So the GDP permits flow all the way down the supply chain to the owners of the ultimate factors of production, and then those households in turn use the GDP permits they earn to buy goods from firms. This makes enforcement a lot easier, since the firms will want to ensure they get the GDP permits when they sell goods, because they need those permits to pay their own suppliers, workers, and owners. It's a bit like the GST (VAT), only in reverse.

The Statistics Canada employees recognise that the tradeable GDP permits are themselves valuable, so measure the prices of goods to include the value of the GDP permits received in exchange. A tradeable permit is just like a tax, and Statistics Canada decides to measure GDP inclusive of indirect taxes like VAT and the GDP permits. So firms compete for those GDP permits, by trying to offer low prices for high-quality goods. And the lower the price, the fewer GDP permits the firm needs to collect when it sells the goods. Eventually the GDP permits become so valuable that the firms are willing to give away their goods for free, except for the GDP permits. And households too are willing to give away their labour for free, except for the GDP permits. "You can drive this car off the lot for 15,000 GDP permits!". "Staff wanted; pay is 15 GDP permits per hour".

Now, the environmentalists in my story may be a bit rabid, but they do understand the stock-flow distinction. They know that a fixed stock of GDP permits may permit many different levels of GDP, which is a flow. It all depends on how quickly GDP permits circulate from households to firms, and back to households again. They introduce the concept of the "velocity of circulation" of GDP permits. Since it's too hard to put a "use by" date on each GDP permit, they decide to adjust the stock of GDP permits in circulation to try to offset changes in velocity. If velocity rises, so GDP rises above the environmentalists' target they reduce the stock of GDP permits in circulation by buying them back. They create a special "Central GDP Permit Bank" just for this purpose. And if velocity falls, so GDP falls below the environmentalists' target, the central bank increases the stock of GDP permits in circulation.

And the environmentalists in my story may be a bit rabid, but they also understand the distinction between nominal and real GDP. Since all goods and labour are now free, except for the GDP permits you need to pay in exchange, all prices are now measured in terms of GDP permits. If the stock of GDP permits is too small, individual firms and households will cut prices in terms of GDP permits, trying to compete for GDP permits against other firms and households. So the value of each permit will rise. And if the stock of GDP permits is too large, individual firms and households will raise prices in terms of GDP permits, since they worry less about competition from other firms and households. So the value of each permit will fall. So the environmentalists use their central bank to adjust the stock of GDP permits in circulation to try to prevent their value rising or falling too quickly.

Then one day the system breaks down. Something causes the velocity of circulation of GDP permits to fall. The central bank fails to respond quickly enough to increase the stock of GDP permits. (Because environmentalist hawks are afraid this would cause the value of GDP permits to drop). So the value of those permits starts to rise, so people hoard even more GDP permits against an uncertain future, which reduces velocity still further.

So we end up with a lot of apparently Zero Value Marginal Product unemployed workers.

Everything changes when you don't just use barter to trade stuff, but have to use money/GDP permits instead.

(This started out as a response to Bryan Caplan. But then I got carried away.)

Also see Tyler Cowen's article in Foreign Policy where he argues that high unemployment is caused by a decrease in the productivity of American workers:

...Many conservatives in the United States have placed the blame for high unemployment on the shoulders of President Barack Obama, arguing that his administration's liberal agenda has complicated the recovery. But the statistics suggest otherwise. Again, corporate profits and consumer spending are fine. Indeed, it's the sector in which the government has most directly intervened -- health care -- that has maintained the most robust job growth over the past two years, adding 20,000 new jobs in November alone. And don't go blaming job losses on illegal immigrants taking jobs from documented workers: Latino immigrants have left the country in large numbers since the start of the financial crisis.

As time passes, it is harder to avoid the notion that a lot of those old jobs simply weren't adding much to the economy. Except for the height of the housing boom -- October 2007 through June 2008 -- real GDP is now higher than it has been in the entirety of U.S. history. The fact that the United States has pre-crisis levels of output with fewer workers raises doubts as to whether those additional workers were producing very much in the first place. If a business owner fires 10 people and a year later output is almost back to normal, it's pretty hard to make the argument that they were doing much in the first place.

The story runs as follows. Before the financial crash, there were lots of not-so-useful workers holding not-so-useful jobs. Employers didn't so much bother to figure out who they were. Demand was high and revenue was booming, so rooting out the less productive workers would have involved a lot of time and trouble -- plus it would have involved some morale costs with the more productive workers, who don't like being measured and spied on. So firms simply let the problem lie.

Then came the 2008 recession, and it was no longer possible to keep so many people on payroll. A lot of businesses were then forced to face the music: Bosses had to make tough calls about who could be let go and who was worth saving. (Note that unemployment is low for workers with a college degree, only 5 percent compared with 16 percent for less educated workers with no high school degree. This is consistent with the reality that less-productive individuals, who tend to have less education, have been laid off.)

In essence, we have seen the rise of a large class of "zero marginal product workers," to coin a term. Their productivity may not be literally zero, but it is lower than the cost of training, employing, and insuring them. That is why labor is hurting but capital is doing fine; dumping these employees is tough for the workers themselves -- and arguably bad for society at large -- but it simply doesn't damage profits much. It's a cold, hard reality, and one that we will have to deal with, one way or another.

...the U.S. economy is going through some major structural shifts. It's not a question of getting back to where we were, but rather that the economy must solve a new problem of re-employing a lot of people who were not, in reality, producing very much in the first place. That's a steeper challenge than we had realized early in the stages of this recession -- and so far policymakers have failed at meeting it.

Analysts still disagree on how rapidly the U.S. economy will recover. But they're missing the point. The era of low unemployment may be in our rearview mirror for a long time to come.

Why Texas Creates Jobs

Mulligan's problem is that he forgets that demand matters more than supply. In the case of immigration, there is approximately zero change in unemployment because the immigrants bring demand too. This is a common fallacy by the anti-immigration side of the immigration debate, but it is surprising that Mulligan makes it.

Casey B. Mulligan: More Evidence That Supply Matters - NYTimes.com: "The supply of various types of workers has increased during the recession, continuing an earlier trend. That such trends continue to be associated with trends for employment contradicts the Keynesian claim that supply suddenly stops mattering during recessions and “liquidity traps.” A number of bloggers have pointed out that employment in Texas has been rising and has almost reached prerecession levels. Paul Krugman’s explanation is that the supply of people available and willing to work has been increasing in Texas, continuing a previous trend.
One example of that supply is the inflow of immigrants from nearby Mexico; another is the migration of Americans seeking cheaper housing. Recession-era supply episodes like these are important to identify, because they can prove or reject Keynesians’ fundamental assertion (so far unproven) that supply does not matter during a recession or a “liquidity trap” such as we’ve experienced since the recession began.
...
Consider, hypothetically, an immigration trend that continued even after the recession. In my view, the market would create jobs for many, but not all, of the immigrants and would continue to do so after the recession.
In the Keynesian view, immigration might create jobs before the recession, but could not create them once the recession began because “what’s limiting employment now is lack of demand for the things workers produce,”Professor Krugman wrote. “Their incentives to seek work are, for now, irrelevant.”
In the Keynesian view, all that extra supply does during the recession is add to unemployment rather than adding to employment. In other words, supply trends normally affect employment, but Keynesians assert that they cease to affect employment during a recession or liquidity trap.
The chart below shows monthly employment (left scale) and unemployment (right scale) in Texas since 2007. Despite the fact that our nation is in a liquidity trap (near-zero interest rates on Treasury bills, the results of the extra supply in Texas since 2009 have been to increase employment much more than increase unemployment.

Data From The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Or consider that more recent cohorts have found themselves in careers that involve less manual labor, producing a increasing number of people reaching age 65 and still willing and able to continue their work. In my view, elderly employment would rise and might even be rising enough to more than offset a demand reduction during a recession.
In the Keynesian view, all that extra supply does during the recession is add to unemployment rather than adding to employment.
When it comes to analyzing specific events during the recession, fiscal stimulus advocates often take the common sense approach that labor supply affects employment. But when it comes to making promises about the anticipated results of a large fiscal stimulus, they insist, without proof, that supply doesn’t matter.

For another view: Jobs and Population Growth | ThinkProgress: 

Texas’ robust job growth is a consequence of its robust population growth so if you want to replicate Texas results on a national basis then you need some story about increasing America’s population growth rate. An alternate story, being pressed on me via email over the weekend, is that people are moving to Texas because that’s where the jobs are. I have two reasons for doubting this, one empirical and one theoretical.
Empirically speaking, it’s just not the case that Texas has an unusually low unemployment rate. If people were trying to move toward labor market opportunities they’d be leaving Texas and moving to the Great Plains. The basic point is illustrated by the fact that Texas has consistently maintained a faster population growth rate than Iowa even though Iowa has always had a lower unemployment rate. In some sense the labor market “wants” people to move to Iowa. But in practice, people want to move to Texas. And in the aggregate, jobs are moving to Texas where the people are:
Theoretically, America has an overwhelmingly service driven economy. People sell things to each other. In China, entrepreneurs to build factories in places with “factory friendly” locations and then people move there. But this is not how the American economy works. It’s more like the reverse. If you run Darden Restaurants and you decide you have reason to believe that population growth is going to surge in West Virginia then you say to yourself “with more people living in West Virginia, there will be more business opportunities for the Red Lobster in West Virginia.” Then you go about building restaurants, creating construction jobs and cook jobs and waiter jobs. Along with restaurants, the people moving to West Virginia will need accountants and lawyers and doctors and big box stores. They’ll need houses to live in. The new, larger population will pay more in taxes and will require more police officers and teachers and DMV clerks. Population growth, in other words, will lead to job growth.
The opposite isn’t going to work. If the Governor of West Virginia rings up Darden HQ in Orlando and says “hey, we have a really business friendly environment you should open up some more restaurants” the answer is going to be “well, no, you have a poor state with a declining population.”
Now I don’t want to deny that it’s impossible for job creation to lead to population growth. If the Defense Department relocates its headquarters to West Virginia, people will move to West Virginia. If they discover diamond mines in West Virginia, people will move to West Virginia. But in the contemporary United States most people earn a living providing services to other people, so population movements should create jobs more than job-creation leading to population movement. This is why, I think, we see strong population growth in Texas amidst meh unemployment performance even as people remain reluctant to move to low unemployment plains states.
So, why are people moving to Texas??  It has a lot going for it.
1. Climate.  All warm weather states have seen greater population growth than cool-weather states since air conditioners became affordable. 
2. Few zoning regulations make for cheap housing.  Texas housing is a big reason why people move there.  It also helps that construction is cheaper in mild climates because of shallow pipes, foundations, less insulation, no furnace (use heat pump technology instead - it is just an air conditioner in reverse), etc.
3. Longest Mexican border.  Texas has had a much bigger influx of Latin American immigration than most of the country. 
4. Largest Hispanic population at 38% of population after New Mexico.  Hispanics have higher fertility rates than average in America, particularly recent immigrants which are a large percentage of Texans.  

Texas has one of the highest population growth rates of any state because of the above qualities.  Should you move there to get a job too? 
1. Per-capita income in Texas is right in the middle.  About half of states have higher incomes.  Real living standards are boosted by the mild climate and cheap housing, so this may understate the case for Texas. 
2. Unemployment in Texas is right in the middle.  About half of states have lower unemployment rates as of the most recent data (June 2011).